In this Federal Court case, Pfizer’s attempt to obtain documentation from Sandoz regarding its ERELZI etanercept product failed, Justice Burley finding that undertakings provided by Sandoz to give notice prior to exploiting ERELZI products in Australia removed any reasonable belief that Pfizer might have the right to obtain relief as at the time of the application. The circumstances illustrate the significance of the form of undertakings given by potential generic/biosimilar entrants when patent disputes erupt.
The background to this case is set out in more detail here. In short, Pfizer markets the highly successful etanercept therapy under the name BRENZYS in Australia, for conditions including rheumatoid and psoriatic arthritis. In October 2017 Sandoz obtained registration on the Australian Register of Therapeutic Goods (ARTG) for its biosimilar, ERELZI. The Department of Health’s Pharmaceutical Board Advisory Committee recommended that the products be listed in March 2018, subject to certain further information being provided. In April 2018 Sandoz informed the Department of Health that it had decided not to proceed to the next step “at this point in time”. Sandoz has taken no further steps with respect to launch of ERELZI in Australia since that time. In December 2019, Pfizer sought preliminary discovery from Sandoz for documents relating to the manufacture of ERELZI, on the basis that it may have a right to relief for infringement of three of its patents.
The test for obtaining preliminary discovery has recently been clarified by the Full Court of the Federal Court in a case brought by Pfizer against Samsung Bioepsis in respect of its biosimilar etanercept product. The Full Court confirmed that as long as there are reasonable grounds for a belief that there may be a right to relief, it is not necessary to show, for example via expert evidence, that such a claim would succeed. Indeed the purpose of obtaining preliminary discovery is to determine whether a right to relief in fact exists.
In light of the Samsung decision, it would likely have been difficult for Sandoz to show in this case that Pfizer did not have the requisite level of belief that ERELZI may fall within the scope of the claims of its patents, and indeed Sandoz accepted that Pfizer had such belief for the purposes of the application.
However, Sandoz relied on undertakings offered to Pfizer, pursuant to which it undertook not to exploit any ERELZI products in Australia or take steps to proceed with PBS listing, for the duration of the patent, without first giving Pfizer certain notice. The length of the notice offered is not recorded in the judgment for confidentiality reasons, however the judgment notes that in earlier correspondence Sandoz had offered to give Pfizer 150 days’ prior written notice. It is assumed therefore that the notice period offered is relatively substantial. Sandoz also agreed to provide certain discovery with a period of time after giving any such notice (the details of this undertaking were also confidential).
In these circumstances, Pfizer contended that the notice period offered was insufficient to allow it to obtain relief in time if Sandoz did in fact give notice of an intention to launch. It sought an order that Sandoz give preliminary discovery of specified schedules of documents within 7 days of giving the relevant notice and a ‘Sabre order’ requiring it to seek production of any such documents held by related companies. The issues were therefore quite confined.
Burley J refused the orders sought by Pfizer. Based on the language of the relevant Federal Court Rules governing preliminary discovery, his Honour concluded that Pfizer needed to show a reasonable belief that its rights may be infringed as at the date when the application is being assessed. Calling in aid notions of quia timet relief, Pfizer argued that the relevant question was whether it held a reasonable belief that the notice offered by Sandoz was likely to affordPfizer sufficient time to protect itself from material harm. However Burley J held that the circumstances of the case did not warrant a reading of the Rules which would in effect provide an exception to the reluctance of the Court to answer questions based on hypothetical facts, as was the case here where Sandoz had not yet made a decision to launch. He gave examples of difficulties which could arise, in particular, the appropriate scope of any preliminary discovery could be affected by admissions which Sandoz might make with respect to infringement.
While the outcome in this case is highly dependent on the specific facts, it does highlight the effectiveness of appropriately crafted undertakings in resisting legal action, where a product has been listed on the ARTG and steps have been taken to list on the PBS, circumstances which would generally amount to a threat of patent infringement, in the absence of any undertakings.
Preliminary discovery applications are set to become a more common weapon in patent litigation arsenal in years to come, particularly given the increasing significance in Australia (as elsewhere) of biosimilar patent litigation, where patents covering manufacturing processes are likely to assume greater importance given the additional complexities at play in claiming active biological molecules per se, and the significance of specific manufacturing processes in the production of biologics. Given the likely lack of available information as to a competitor’s manufacturing processes, preliminary discovery may be an essential prelude to patent infringement claims in such cases, assisted by the planned Therapeutic Goods Administration “transparency measures” which will introduce an earlier notification scheme for generic and biosimilar medicines. Equally we expect to see the strategies to resist such applications develop providing more case law in this area.
Authored by Katrina Crooks